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Organizational and managerial theories of modularity applied to the
design and production of complex artifacts are used to interpret the
rise and success of Free/Open Source Software methodologies and
practices in software engineering. Strengths and risks of the adoption
of a modular approach in software project management are introduced
and are related to the achievements of the GNU/Linux project as a
whole, as well as to the outcomes of some of its sub{projects. It is
suggested that mindful implementation of the principles of modularity
may improve the rate of success of many Free/Open Source software
projects. Specic case studies here depicted, as well as indirect ob-
servation of common programming practices employed by Free/Open
Source developers and users, suggest a possible revision towards an
improved theory of modularity that may be extended also to settings
dierent from software production.
Keywords: modularity, software project management, Free/Open Source
Software, division of labor, coordination, information hiding.
1 Introduction
The GNU/Linux operating system growing popularity has conveyed increas-
ing attention to the Free/Open Source Software (F/OSS) development model,
usually described as a radically dierent system of rules, practices, and rela-
tionships, shared within a large and virtually distributed software developers
community, alternative to proprietary and closed development techniques
employed by traditional hierarchical organizations in the software industry.
From a variety of complementary perspectives, a growing number of stud-
ies are analyzing some key issues, in the attempt to understand the bases of
such successful phenomenon. Our study is a rigorous and analytical attempt
2to interpret the design and the development of F/OSS in terms of a theory
of modularity.
We argue that modularity, which can be regarded as an innovative manu-
facturing paradigm for the design and the production of complex artifacts, is
a key element in explaining the development and the success of many F/OSS
projects, and it oers a comprehensive explanation of many key issues in
F/OSS development, such as how division of labor takes place within devel-
opers, how coordination is achieved and how code testing and integration is
deployed, how innovation occurs, and so on.
Our reconsideration of the history of the GNU/Linux operating system
highlights how the development process beneted from the typical advantages
of implementing modular architectures (e.g. fast speed of development, re-
combination of modules, innovation through projects competition, reuse of
previously developed code), while, at the same time, many critical pitfalls
usually related to the architectural design of modules and interfaces were
avoided. As we show in the paper, the design of the system was clearly in-
herited from a previously existing operating system platform, namely Unix.
Further, we will argue that, while traditionally information hiding has
been viewed as the key principle guiding the design and the implementation
of modular software artifacts, F/OSS development successful case studies
seem to massively disregard this principle at the implementation level.
As a result, the GNU/Linux case study and the empirical observation on
the rise and success of many F/OSS projects, suggest a possible step further
in one of the most critical and controversial software engineering debate (Par-
nas's vs. Brook's view on information hiding of software modules). Further-
more, this empirical study suggests some neat observations pushing ahead
our view of modularity, more and more often proposed as a new paradigm
for design and production, even though it is still regarded by some authors
as a black box. Moving from a stereotypical denition, centered on mod-
ules and interfaces, this paper will sketch some answers for several critical
3unsolved issues related to modularity, such as (i) the relationships between
organizational structure and architecture design in modular projects, (ii) the
role of the designer of a modular architecture as problem solver, (iii) how
modularity copes with unforeseen interdependencies.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces some of the most
relevant topics of modularity in management and organization science. Then,
it turns to software development, suggesting the idea of modularity as one of
the fundamental issues in the evolution of the software engineering debate.
In Section 3 some F/OSS case studies are described and interpreted through
the lens of the theory of modular systems. Finally, Section 4 sketches some
reections on how F/OSS methodologies and practices may fully benet by
employing a mindful modular approach to the design and implementation of
complex software projects, and suggests how the peculiar implementation of
the principles of modularity represented by F/OSS may help in rening both
existing theories of modularity, and their empirical application to domain
dierent from software production.
2 Modularity
Modularity has being receiving increasing attention and popularity in a vari-
ety of elds, like neuroscience, articial intelligence, architecture and urban
design, management. Nowadays a modular approach is applied to complex
projects in R&D, industrial manufacturing and software engineering, and
modularity has been assumed as a key{concept in the design and production
of a great number of artifacts, both physical, like buildings, cars, furniture,
and immaterial ones, like software.
The interdisciplinary interest is largely due to the fact that modularity is
regarded as a general property of complex systems, pertaining to the degree
of decomposability of a system in loosely coupled sub{parts made by tightly
coupled components [Schilling, 2000]. Literature on modularity emphasizes
4the importance of structures and relationships, and the outlined models all
rely on an underlying system theory which provides a framework for under-
standing and describing in a suitable way the specic object of study (arti-
facts, objects, machines, tasks, molecules, spaces, projects, etc.). A modular
system is thus represented as a complex of components or sub{systems where
designers try to minimize and standardize the interdependencies among mod-
ules.
In the paper we argue that, in order to outline a theory of modularity
it is important to make a step forward and understand how modularization
(modularity in action) takes place. From this point of view, the design of
modular architectures gains special attention, as well as the process by which
modular representations of the problem space are introduced and used in the
design.
Herbert Simon's inuence in the way modularity has been represented,
is particularly evident [Devetag and Zaninotto, 2001]. First of all, modu-
larity is often introduced within a problem solving framework and modular
design is regarded as a solution to cope with uncertainty and variability. Sec-
ond, Simon's analysis of the Articial as a complex system is extended to
both activity (tasks) and objects (hierarchies), involves the decomposition of
the system and have to deals with residual interdependencies [Simon, 1981].
As a matter of fact, speculations about modularity in management science
are addressed to both production [Schilling, 2000, Badwin and Clark, 2000,
Langlois, 2002] and product [Ulrich, 1995, Schilling, 2000].
Nonetheless, Simon's lesson goes further and has to be extended in order
to understand the modularity black{box. Tempus and Hora parable is often
introduced as a general problem analogous to the one modularity deal with:
decomposition of product and task. Unfortunately, the decomposition itself
is a complex problem to solve, since decompositions in sub-subproblems im-
ply that the problem solvers have already structured a situation and they
rely on that representation in order to dene the problem space. Then, from
the problem solver perspective the representations of the problem space of
5new complex artifacts, like for instance an operative system, do no exist per
se, and need to be encountered in problem-solving fashion1. Designers are,
rst of all, cognitive problem solvers that deal with the representation of new,
undetermined objects. They usually develop and introduce concepts, beliefs,
practices and routines that are they use to progressively structure in a very
specic manner what at the beginning was a blurry context. Likewise, mod-
ular architectures of complex artifacts are a consequence of particular kinds
of problem space representations that do not exist by themselves, but that
come out at the end of process of exploration (generation and evaluation) of
possible solutions. Among all the possible representations, modular archi-
tectures are distinguished for some fundamental traits: the decomposition of
the problem in sub-problems binds most of the interdependencies inside sub-
problems (modules) that are usually specialized and that interact through
standardized units (interfaces).
2.1 Modularity in management and organization sci-
ence
In management and organization science literature, modularity has been in-
troduced as a new paradigm for rm manufacturing [Ulrich, 1995, Schilling,
2000], organization design [Badwin and Clark, 2000] and for a general theory
of the rm [Langlois, 2002]. Modularity provides relevant advantages that
have been neatly identied in the literature. Modularity allows of products
variety that is obtained by recombination (mix and match) of components.
Modularity is viewed as a base for dierentiation strategy: rms may enrich
their product catalog and adapt to customers needs with limited additional
costs. Moreover, modularity has also a great impact on production process
as it positively aects exibility, division of labor and specialization [Devetag
and Zaninotto, 2001].
1Some relevant analysis along this direction has been done [Marengo et al., 2001, 2000,
Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000], even though it still lacks of strong emprical evidence.
6According to Badwin and Clark [2000] modularity in production systems
is obtained following some general rules, originally drowned from computer
science and software development, concerning two dierent categories of in-
formation: visible and hidden information. Modular systems design needs to
specify only the visible rules, namely the information about: a) architecture
denition, b) interfaces specications and c) modules integration tests. The
amount of information about the inner description of each modules and their
working is hidden from outside; it does not need to be dened ex{ante or
shared during the process, since modules interactions follow exclusively the
rules specied in the interfaces parameters.
Unfortunately, this neat description of modular design sometimes does
not succeed; most of the times, after the integration of the independently
developed modules, inconsistencies come upon and the system does not work
properly. The most common reason for this failure is the emergence of some
interdependencies which were left out at the beginning, at the time of ar-
chitecture and interfaces denition. The decomposition of a complex system
is not at all a trivial activity, especially because most of the time it pro-
duces quasi{decomposable modules with some degree of interdependencies
that may be out of control.
In our view, modularity design and development (modularization) are the
key activities that have to be investigated in order to get into this black box,
as Brusoni and Prencipe [2001] call it. Who is the designer? How come a de-
signer develop from scratch a representation of the complex integrated system
that has to be reduced in terms of quasi{decomposable modules (modular-
ization)? Even in Badwin and Clark [2000] remarkable study on design and
modularity, these issues are not fully considered and modularization is mainly
regarded as abstract denition of some design rules about the architecture,
the interfaces and the integration protocols. From our perspective, modu-
larization needs to be analyzed as an activity and our attention is focused
on three main research goals: rst, understanding the initial problem which
is a cognitive activity that comes out with the denition of modules bound-
7aries. Second, nding empirical evidence that modular design may be more
complex than interconnected design, due to the strong constraints posed by
the ex{ante denition of the visible information. Third, considering under
which conditions the amount of interdependencies that have been neglected
at the design stage may be reduced further on during implementation of the
architecture.
2.2 Modularity in software development
The notion of modularity is central in the design and production of software
artifacts, especially for large and complex projects. Since from the early days
of software engineering the issue of designing, developing, testing and releas-
ing a large software project brought into discussion the trade{o between
simplicity and speed of development. The dilemma that software engineers
were facing is, in the words of Brooks [1975], the following one:
\For eciency and conceptual integrity, one prefers a few good minds
doing design and construction. Yet for large systems one wants a way to
bring considerable manpower to bear, so that the product can make a timely
appearance. How can these two needs be reconciled?"
Frederick Brooks, the author of one of the most inuential software project
management textbook, clearly recognized that small sharp teams performed
better than large ones, but they were not enough staed to deliver large
software projects under schedule pressure. Conversely, while larger teams
potentially increased the pace of the development process, they also resulted
in overwhelming needs for coordination of individual eorts and in dimin-
ishing marginal returns of manpower on productivity (also known in the
extreme case of negative marginal returns as the \Brooks' Law"). As a re-
sult, eciency and conceptual integrity of the whole project were at risk,
since men and months where not fully interchangeable units in the decision
of dimensioning and stang of a project.
8Ecient software engineering methodologies are meant to solve this fun-
damental trade{o between task partition and division of labor, on the one
hand, and coordination and communication costs, on the other one. Brooks'
recipe for coping with the design and the production of complex software
was to divide labor vertically so to separate as much as possible high level
activities (such as the design of a software artifact) from lower ones (such as
implementation of code). As a result, even a large software project might
have been guided by a small number of architectural designers, hence reduc-
ing coordination and communication costs needed to conceive the architec-
tural blueprint of the project. A second related element in Brook's recipe
was then to assign the implementation of each part of the project to small
and focused teams (the so called \surgical team").
In terms of a modern theory of modularity, the basic assumption inside
Brook's seminal work is that large software projects are integral and non{
decomposable, therefore complex, systems, where interactions among parts
are nontrivial and generate high communication and coordination costs. Ver-
tical division of labor is viewed as the way to avoid as much as possible these
cost ineciencies by concentrating design and architectural activities on few
heads. What is clearly overlooked from Brook's perspective is that inter-
dependencies may be not only considered as given constraints, but rather
they may be strongly reduced at the architectural design level, by eective
decomposing the complex system in quasi{independent subparts.
As a matter of fact the introduction of a fully modular approach in mod-
ern software engineering methodologies has been fostered by the recognition
that the degree of interdependencies may be strongly reduced if a complex
software project can be decomposed in independent subparts, that is, divid-
ing the whole project in smaller components that are loosely coupled and
highly independent one to each other [von Hippel, 1990, Langlois, 2002].
Hence, when subparts are almost independent it is possible to divide labor
minimizing in miscoordination and communication costs.
Conceiving the design of a complex software artifact as a modular system
9means to apply the basic principle of \information hiding", originally devel-
oped by Parnas [1972], that prescribe to treat software modules as opaque
entities, whose relevant information is only available to its inner programmer,
while not being accessible to external programmers. Here module interfaces
are the only information that is revealed, while all information regarding the
design and how the module works is not communicated.
This approach to the design of software artifacts has been radically criti-
cized since the beginning by Brooks and other scholars. As noted by Brooks
[1995]:
\Harlan Mills have argued pervasively that `programming should be a
public process', that exposing all the work to everybody's gaze helps quality
control, both by peer pressure to do things well and by peers actually spotting
aws and bugs".
Conversely, information hiding limits this process in that the innards
of modules not their own are not available so that one has to infer what's
on the other side of the fence (the module interface) just looking at the
interface details. As a matter of fact, if we take a look at current software
practices nowadays, the widespread adoption of object oriented languages,
the diusion of component based development and many other popular trends
in software engineering seems to have at large armed information hiding
and modularity as the winners in the debate between interconnected versus
modular software design. Even Brooks, in the 20th year anniversary edition
of his \The Mythical Man{Month" , admits the following: \Parnas was right,
and I was wrong on information hiding".
One of the key ideas of this paper is to show that the rise and arma-
tion of F/OSS development techniques, may be interpreted as the latest step
in this 30{year old debate, since it shows that eventually Brooks was not
completely wrong on information hiding. We will highlight in the following
advantages and drawbacks of modular design and production of software ar-
tifacts. In the next Subsections, then, we will prove evidence of how F/OSS
10coding practices can be seen as unorthodox implementation of standard mod-
ular production techniques. Notably, we will argue that the power and the
real novelty of F/OSS techniques lie in being modular at the design and early
implementation stages of a project, while at the same time avoiding the typi-
cal pitfalls and limits of information hiding at the integration, debugging and
testing phases of a project, where strict encapsulation and hiding is violated
on a regular basis and where programming activities again are regarded, as
in the Brooks' original vision, as a \public process".
In order to do that, we previously have to speculate a little bit more on
the topic of interdependencies in software modules. A software product ar-
chitecture may be dened as a mapping of required functions of the product
in functional components. The system as a whole is decomposed in a set
of functional modules whose interactions provide the overall functionality of
the system [Ulrich, 1995, Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996]. As in the case of
hardware artifacts, one has to determine not only how to divide the whole
system in subparts, and how to assign functional requirements to subparts,
but also how any component has to communicate and interact with every
other component in the architecture [Sanchez, 2000]. Software seem to be a
peculiar artifact if compared to physical artifacts when it comes to the topic
of component interactions. As a matter of fact, components interface speci-
cation, dening interactions between components, seems, at a rst glance,
to result in system of less rigid constraints for the modules. In particular,
physically specications on how one component has to be connected to the
other ones (\attachment interfaces", following the taxonomy developed by
Sanchez [2000]), spatial, volume, weight constraints of a component (\spatial
interfaces") and other environmental interactions pertaining the generation
of heat, vibrations, magnetic elds bearing consequences to other components
(\environmental interfaces"2), clearly do not apply to the case of software
2More precisely, it should be noted that while this may be true for \hardware{based"
environmental interactions, other kinds of environmental interactions, software{based,
may emerge, such as the inuence in common resources aecting the use of those common
11modules.
Then, at a rst sight, it may be reasonable to expect that, given the exis-
tence of fewer sources of components interactions, designing and developing
loosely coupled software artifacts would be easier than the case of hardware
products such as standard physically assembled goods.
On the contrary, both theoretical software engineering literature and em-
pirical case studies of software product development suggest that integrat-
ing software components may be harder than assembling hardware artifacts:
Brooks' famous essay on the diculties of software engineering techniques
in granting improvements in productivity, reliability and simplicity in de-
veloping software programs, may help us in rening our explanations of why
integrating software modules and thus as a whole producing modularized soft-
ware may be dicult [Brooks, 1986]. The author speculate on the fundamen-
tal properties of software entities that may account for the diculties in sep-
arating interdependencies and decompose large software projects: software
entities dier from physical artifacts for their highly nonlinear complexity,
leading to the impossibility to enumerate (not to mention understand) all the
possible state of a program. As the size of a software project increases, it be-
comes more and more dicult to decompose interdependencies and to design
an architecture that preserve the initial conceptual integrity of the software
project by combination of loosely coupled functional software components.
Moreover, software is invisible. The same intangible attributes that seem to
free software entities from standard physical constraints that hardware ones
have to satisfy, seem at the same time to aect human abilities of antic-
ipating correctly component interface specications and interdependencies.
While geometric abstraction are powerful tools that may help the architec-
tural design for assembly goods (\Contradictions become obvious, omissions
can be caught." [Brooks, 1986]), similar geometrical representations do not
help much during the design phase of software structures because source of
interdependencies are more subtle, not visible, and related to a series of ele-
resources by other components.
12ments (\ow of control, ow of data, patterns of dependency, time sequence,
name{space relationships" [Brooks, 1986]) whose interrelations may be only
partially caught by diagrams and ow charts.
As a consequence, the process of modular software design tends to be a
faulty one, where testing, debugging and integration phases may be much
more relevant in terms of resources needed compared to the production of
manufacturing artifacts. This is largely due to the fact that even the act
of decomposing a large software project into components is an activity that,
given the multidimensional and invisible nature of interdependencies com-
bined to bounded rationality of human designers of architectures, result, at
its best, in a suboptimal outcome where while some source of interdependen-
cies are well determined and taken into account in the design of components
and in the design of interfaces, others are not. In some sense, even careful
modularization of large software projects tends to be accomplished making
trade{os between source of interdependencies, recognizing the more visible
ones and disregarding the less evident or less important ones. These reasons,
combined with the huge size of large software project, account for the di-
culties in the subsequent integration { testing { assembly phases. Likewise,
less careful modularization result in even greater problems at the nal stages
of code integration.
This is what originally struggled Brooks when he was criticizing Parnas'
principles of information hiding. Brooks thought that programming should
have been a public process where all information should have been completely
available in order for failures in the design of software to become evident and
to be corrected.
In the following we will review some well known case studies of F/OSS
projects, trying to describe how F/OSS practices have uniquely adopted the
paradigm of modularity. In particular we will try to highlight and to relate
success or failure of specic projects to advantages and strengths of modular-
ity, on the one side, and to risks, pitfalls and drawbacks of modularity on the
other hand. Furthermore, we will try to better understand how F/OSS prac-
13tices and pragmatics result in an improved implementation of the paradigm
of modular software production, where the principle of information hiding
is invoked at the design level while being later disregarded, at the imple-
mentation level, in the later stages of the process, where the free ow of
information is eectively used in order to speed up the production process,
taking advantage of what Brooks originally described as \programming as a
public process".
3 Rise and success of a F/OSS project: the
GNU/Linux case
GNU/Linux is part of a wider phenomenon that has its historical roots in an
attempt to use intellectual property rights against a group of software devel-
opers. The leader of this group of hackers was Richard Stallman, the software
that was covered by copyright was Unix, an operative system developed in
a few years by a group of developers working for universities and private
companies, the company that suddenly patented the system was AT&T, the
time was 1979. As a reaction to the legal ties imposed on what had been de-
veloped as shared and open product, in 1984 Stallman started a new project
called GNU (GNU is Not Unix) to develop free software. According to the
GNU manifesto, people are free to read and use the software, free to change
and improve it, free to make copies and distribute it. The only restriction is
that new modied code inherits the same freedom of the original code. This
form of hereditary freedom rights in using, changing and copying software
was stated in special kind of copyright, the GNU Public Licence (GPL, also
known as \copyleft"). This way Stallman succeeded in using copyright laws
to preserve freedom on software use and manipulation. A growing community
of software developers started to publish their application under GPL and in
a few years a library of stable, ecient and well{done GNU applications were
available. What GNU was still lacking of was the core part of an operative
14system, the kernel, as the GNU kernel project (HURD) was developing very
slowly. Linus Torvalds' kernel lled this gap and GNU/Linux, a complete
free operating system alternative to existing commercial and proprietary de-
veloped ones, started to be distributed in 1991.
3.1 Free/Open Source Software: origins, myth and
stereotypes
Put it this way, the most prominent and visible example of F/OSS develop-
ment seems to loose much of the radically revolutionary elements suggested
by many popular accounts on the rise and success of the Linux operating
system [Raymond, 1999]. Rather than being a completely innovative piece
of code that was obtained using radically new techniques of software de-
velopment, more mature interpretations of the phenomenon have already
highlighted the existing similarities both at the architectural level with older
operating systems (namely, the Unix operating system) and at the develop-
ment level with formerly diused coding practices among computer scientists
and hackers (namely, to share the source code) [Stallman, 1999, Bezroukov,
1999a, Kuwabara, 2000].
As Bezroukov [1999b] neatly stated regarding open source:
\To me it is just another form of a scientic community. Similarly for me
the development of Linux is not a new and revolutionary model, but just a
logical continuation of the Free Software Foundation's (FSF) GNU project."
Accordingly, in the following we argue that, in order to understand the
real revolutionary terms of GNU/Linux, one has in the rst place to adopt
an historical perspective on the evolution of GNU/Linux, through the lens
of the theory of modular systems design and production.
153.2 Mimicking a previously existing design
At a closer inspection the Unix operating system can be viewed as a highly
modular, scalable and portable platform. The Unix architecture is a complex
and massively decomposed architecture of independent modules, character-
ized by high specialization of programs (\programs that do one thing and do
it well"), working together by means of \pipes" (making possible to connect
the standard output of one program as the standard input of another one,
allowing to communicate between dierent program and to execute complex
tasks by means of composition of elementary actions), and sharing as a fun-
damental interface of communication text streams (also known as the \Unix
philosophy" as formulated by McIllroy, the inventor of pipes [Salus, 1994]).
Unix was the rst modern operating system not developed using a hard-
ware dependent assembly language. The kernel was written in C, ensuring
portability to dierent hardware platform [Evers, 2000].3
The highly modular nature of its design structure had strong conse-
quences both at the level of developers coding activities and at the level
of users experience. Developers were able, thanks to the modular design,
to carry out development of specic parts of the system in autonomy and
without any need to coordinate their eorts with other sub{projects. Mod-
ularity not only allowed parallel development but also contribution of new
components and modules allowing to substantially improving the overall de-
sign of the system via module innovation and competition between similar
projects (both completely new modules and variation and improvements in
existing ones). Since the design of Unix elicited experimentation and explo-
ration of new solutions via module innovation, the community of hackers and
computer scientists quickly developed systems to share working solutions to
3As originally noted by Badwin and Clark [2000], another interesting feature of Unix is
represented by being modular not only at the architectural level (static design modularity)
but also in the way, as an operating system, it treats computer resources (dynamic design
modularity). Here we mainly concentrate on the rst facet of modularity, while we will
comment dynamic memory management in the nal Section.
16common problems both in the terms of improvements of existing modules
and creation of new modules [Badwin and Clark, 2000]. At the end{user
level, modularity invited mere users to employ mix and match strategies (re-
combination of dierent modules), allowing them to generate a wide variety
of dierent implementation of the operating system where a large part of
the modules pertaining to the user space were highly customizable and were
chosen according to specic tastes or needs.
Even through this rather short and incomplete account of the early days
of Unix hackerdom, the past arguments should suggest that many of the
elements pertaining to the decentralized and spontaneous nature of Linux
development process are not as innovative and original as many Linux advo-
cates and pasdarans underline. They are rather mostly inherited by Linux
direct ancestor, the Unix operating system. Strangely enough, this almost
self evident argument seems to be mysteriously overlooked in many popular
contributions to the Linux debate.
The GNU project, started in 1984, represented at its beginning a titanic
eort to oer a free alternative to currently existing commercial and propri-
etary operating system. In Stallman [1999] words:
\The principal goal of GNU was to be free software."
In this respect, Stallman's design strategy consisted in cloning an already
existing project, a stable and mature architecture that had been originally
conceived around fteen years before. As suggested by Rosenberg [2000]):
\Stallman says that he chose Unix as his model because that way he
would not have to make any design decisions."
As a matter of fact, the whole GNU project represented the attempt to
recreate the pre{AT&T Unix arcadic era, where the original architecture was
preserved in essence and only some limited and marginal reworking in the
design took place, in order to solve some minor technical disadvantages of
Unix (e.g. the introduction of 32{bit support).
17This reinforces one of the key argument about modularity, that was intro-
duced in the former section: the act of properly designing a complex system
characterized by a modular architecture is not a trivial task. On the contrary,
modularity bears high costs: careful modularization is a cognitive challenging
activity, since it translates in devising a decomposition of the whole system
in autonomous subparts whose interdependencies are reduced to the mini-
mum. Moreover, failure to perfectly modularize an architecture results in
costs of dealing with ne tuning and tempering activities aimed at solving
unexpected and unforeseen interdependencies. We will speculate further on
this principle in Subsection 3.5, when discussing Torvalds' kernel architec-
tural choice for GNU/Linux. Within the present Subsection, it is enough to
note that the architectural choice followed since the beginning by Stallman,
and later widely adopted by the hacker community, has been a conservative
one. A more risky option such as undertaking a radically innovative project
based on the design of a new architecture was disregarded in favor of a safe
and well known alternative.
As was suggested in the Halloween{I document:
\The easiest way to get coordinated behavior from a large, semi{organized
mob is to point them at a known target".
In this respect, the FSF community was able to consciously handle what,
through the lens of the theory of modularity, is a fundamental trade{o
between threats at the design level and opportunities at the implementation
level. As a result, the decision of establishing the GNU project upon a
stable, mature and carefully modularized architecture was the key element
to prot from the typical advantages of modularity (concurrent engineering,
division of labor, decentralized development, innovation via module based
evolutionary dynamics, and much more), while at the same time avoiding the
classic pitfalls and drawbacks of modularity, concerning the risks of imperfect
decomposition in the design of an innovative modular architecture as the
backbone for the project.4
4See also further on how in the case of the GNU/Linux kernel failure to correctly
183.3 Horizontal division of labor, task interdependen-
cies and Brooks' Law
The perspective of modularity seems also to oer other dierent interpre-
tations contrasting many other recurring stereotypes in the debate over the
revolutionary nature of Linux development.
One of the most criticized principle of the by other means seminal and
evocative essay The Cathedral and the Bazaar [Raymond, 1999] is the one
preguring the demise of Brooks' Law within F/OSS development. This view
is supported by a reductio ad absurdum argument, claiming that, if Brooks'
Law were at work, it would not possible to observe such a thing as Linux
development. Conversely, the observation of the Linux case study suggests to
the author that the eects of Brooks' Law may be overcome by other forces,
such as the project leader's capabilities in attracting, motivating and coor-
dinating a team of skilled and talented developers, in a distributed process
strongly facilitated by Internet connectivity as a shared medium of commu-
nication. This argument, that Brooks' Law does not apply to Internet{based
distributed development, has been widely criticized by many authors (see
for instance Bezroukov [1999b], Jones [2000]). Modularity allows us to rene
and clarify those critics suggesting that a large number of participants in a
project may be not a sucient condition to generate dysfunctional eects
such as diminishing or negative marginal return of manpower to productiv-
ity, since the key aspect in this respect is represented by the degree of task
interdependency between the various members belonging to the project. In
this view, the high productivity experimented in the GNU/Linux develop-
ment is interpreted as largely due to the massively modularized structure of
the project, allowing to have highly independent sub{projects joined by a
limited number of developers, resembling in essence the theory of Brooks'
surgical (small, skilled and focused) team, while the role of the Internet in
modularize the architecture resulted in serious troubles for the developers of the HURD
micro{kernel.
19this interpretation is of mere medium of exchange allowing distant commu-
nication.
Actually, our latest claim seems to run straightforward if we look at a
general sub{project within the whole GNU/Linux architecture, but seems
to be rather dicult to accept in some other cases, such as in the case of
the development of the kernel, that have been undertaken thanks to the
coordinated eort of hundreds of contributors. Consequently, we need to
extend and clarify our latest claim, since it is not possible to address the
problem of Brooks' Law and division of labor only at the horizontal level.
We need to extend our analysis in order to consider also vertical division of
labor.
3.4 Vertical division of labor and organization and ar-
chitectural ladders
Another rather famous postulate in Raymond's The Cathedral and the Bazaar
is the following:
\I had been preaching the Unix gospel of small tools, rapid prototyping
and evolutionary programming for years. But I also believed there was a
certain critical complexity above which a more centralized, a priori approach
was required. I believed that the most important software (operating systems
and really large tools like the Emacs programming editor) needed to be built
like cathedrals, carefully crafted by individual wizards or small bands of
mages working in splendid isolation, with no beta to be released before its
time.
Linus Torvalds's style of development { release early and often, dele-
gate everything you can, be open to the point of promiscuity { came as
a surprise. No quiet, reverent cathedral{building here { rather, the Linux
community seemed to resemble a great babbling bazaar of diering agendas
and approaches (aptly symbolized by the Linux archive sites, who'd take
20submissions from anyone) out of which a coherent and stable system could
seemingly emerge only by a succession of miracles." [Raymond, 1999]5
While nding this quote intriguing and insightful in many senses, since it
clearly describes the evolutionary dynamics nature of GNU/Linux develop-
ment [Kuwabara, 2000], we also are convinced that it conveys many mislead-
ing interpretation of the F/OSS phenomenon as a whole. Many authors have
criticized the cathedral versus bazaar metaphor. We hereby are particularly
concerned with a serious and common misinterpretation of this metaphor
when it comes to the topic of the architectural characteristics of GNU/Linux.
The misinterpretation of the above quote runs, simplifying a bit, as fol-
lows: GNU/Linux comes out of the blue from a chaotic mess of contributions
and organizes itself as a coherent system in an apparently self{regulating way,
showing mysteriously spontaneous order. This emergent view of the genesis
of GNU/Linux is misleading in that it suggests the existence of a deregulated
and emergent at architecture. In contrast, we claim that the modular ar-
chitecture of Linux is characterized by being quite hierarchical, rather than
at.
Reducing to the essence, it is indeed possible to distinguish at least two
dierent and hierarchically ordered ladders in GNU/Linux: a higher level, the
kernel space, and a lower one, the user space. As it happens, the celebrated
babbling bazaar, representing the decentralized and anarchic distributed pro-
cess, takes place at the user level and it is fostered by the highly modular
architecture, as described formerly. Conversely, at the higher inner level of
the operating system, the development process seems to be rather dierent:
Linux inner core started to be developed as a one{person hack and only at
a subsequent stage of the process contribution from other developers where
introduced. Moreover, while contributions to the kernel represent an open
process, the integration of code within the kernel has been a process rmly
regulated by the same Torvalds, at the beginning, and later supported by
5See also Subsection 3.6 for related comments on these statements.
21a small group of zealots. In the next Subsection this process will be de-
scribed in much more detail, here we are specically concerned of describing
its consequences at the organizational level. In order to preserve integrity
and coherence within the most important and complex part of the system, at
the kernel space ladder all initial relevant design decisions were largely taken
by Torvalds and by an inner team of developers. The same holds for most of
the subsequent activities of kernel development. While one has to acknowl-
edge the role of code contribution from the bottom (the hacker community),
it is also indisputable that its incorporation in the project has been fueled
by a highly structured and hierachical process of review and selection (albeit
not based on formal authority but rather on competence and reputation).
Sanchez and Mahoney [1996] where the rst to highlight a basic feature
of modular product architectures, namely the isomorphic relationship be-
tween product architecture and organization traits. This seems to be indeed
the case of GNU/Linux that emerged as a stable system not by a succes-
sion of miracles, but rather by exploiting modularity at the user space level,
encouraging decentralization, and carefully crafting and controlling the over-
all consistency of the design at the kernel space, imposing a cathedral{like
hierarchy in code evaluation and integration.
To summarize our point, we nd the cathedral vs. bazaar distinction
seriously misleading. Hence, if one really wants to compare the GNU/Linux
architecture to a bazaar{like structure, he should not look at an ordinary
bazaar, but rather at Kapali Carsi, Istanbul Grand Bazaar, the oldest (15th
century) and largest (over 4400 shops on 30 hectares of land) marketplace
of the world. The most prominent and uncommon feature of this market-
place is that it is not uncovered and out in the open as usually bazaars are.
On the contrary, it is a covered structure owning a complex architecture
protecting a giant labyrinth of shops and various commercial activities. It
has been observed by many that the covered architecture is a fairly regu-
lar structure, which makes the underlying bazaar even more maze{like and
confusing in practice. Just as the building architecture is not aected by
22underlying bazaar activities, GNU/Linux higher ladder, i.e. the kernel, is
largely shielded from decentralized evolutionary dynamics happening at the
user space level.
We have until now emphasized that GNU/Linux is a massive modular
architecture, mostly inherited from a previous design and characterized by
a hierarchical two{ladder architecture that hardly resembles the atness of
the common bazaar. To rene further our analysis we need to admit that,
albeit largely based on the Unix architecture, there does exist something truly
innovative and original in GNU/Linux. This pertains to the operating system
kernel. In the following Subsection we reect on its origins, highlighting
the dierent approaches to modularity and interdependencies decomposition
followed by two dierent projects: the Linux project and the HURD project.
3.5 The kernel issue: modularizing a monolith
Compared to integrated models, modular architectures are characterized by
specialized, loosely{coupled components. Perfect decomposability of complex
systems, like total integration, are idealtypical cases, while real{life systems
are rather characterized by some degree of modularity. Most of the time,
modular design and modular production leave some residual interdependen-
cies among components, that are not managed by the interfaces. GNU/Linux
is known for being a modular complex artifact and its successfull develop-
ment, accomplished by a distributed community of hackers, largely beneted
from that. Therefore, it may be surprising that its core{component, the
so{called kernel, was initially conceived as a highly integrated product and
that eventually acquired a modular structure. Like other analyses (see for
instance [Moon and Sproull, 2000]) our examination is based on indirect
sources of data that come from quite large mass of original documents (e.g.
users groups archives) and rst hand evidence (e.g. interviews and papers
written by the key actors themselves.
As a developer, Linus Torvalds' major eort to the project afterward
23called GNU/Linux was aimed to conceive and write the kernel, that is the
core part of the operative system that could use all the applications and
the libraries of software that had already been developed within the GNU
project.6
At the time Linus Torvalds started to work on its kernel, a long debate
was growing around the advantages oered by an alternative architecture,
called microkernel, designed to work in all possible and dierent processors.7
Compared to traditional, hardware dedicated kernels, microkernels appeared
to be more complex and less ecient. They were more complex because
even simple problems are treated as instances of general tasks that may
involve a higher number of specications and instructions to interact with
other parts of the kernel; therefore, they may result to be less ecient as
they do not take advantage of specic features of the hardware they run on.
While microkernel architecture appeared to be a better solution because of
its recognized technical superiority, Torvalds decided to develop his kernel
in less general terms, thinking that microkernels at the beginning of the `90
were still experimental and too complex projects (at that time Microsoft was
developing its new Windows NT using a microkernel structure) and they
were exhibiting much worse performance [Torvalds, 1999]. By the way, when
Torvalds started to work on its kernel the Free Software Community and
GNU partisans were already involved in the development of a microkernel
(called HURD), but the task seemed to be much far away from its conclusion.
6By the time Torvalds started to conceive the Linux kernel, the GNU project had
developed to the stage of an almost complete free operating system, including all the major
system components, such as terminals, assemblers, compilers, interpreters, debuggers, text
editors, mailers, and many more, but the fundamental one: the kernel.
7As Torvalds put it \When I began to write the Linux kernel, there was an accepted
school of thought about how to write a portable system. The conventional wisdom was
that you had to use a microkernel{style architecture." [Torvalds, 1999]. See also the
well known \Linux is obsolete" amewar in the comp.os.minix newsgroup (reported in
Appendix A of DiBona et al. [1999]), where Linus Torvalds, Andrew Tanenbaum and
other relevant hackers passionately debated on OS design issues and on the strength and
weakness of micro versus monolithic kernels.
24Therefore, the very rst version of Linus' kernel had a monolithic struc-
ture and was also extremely hardware specic, since it was conceived for
working on Intel 80386 processors only . The rst eort to port Linux ker-
nel to another processor (Motorola 68K) showed all the drawbacks of having
a hardware{specic architecture, since the developers of 68K Linux had to
write another hardware{specic kernel from scratch. When Torvalds started
to think about porting Linux to Alpha (another popular processor dierent
from Intel 80386 and Motorola 68K), he realized that the original design was
no longer eective and in 1993 he started to rewrite completely the kernel
code. He decided to keep a monolithic architecture, but he introduced some
degree of modularity in the system design, in order to simplify the portability
task. Therefore, the general kernel model made use of modules and it was
conceived having in mind those elements common to all typical architectures
(even though it was not as rigorous and general as microkernels are). Fol-
lowing this scheme Torvalds could treat separately and conne in modules
out of the core kernel all the hardware{specic pieces of code. These mod-
ules could be later updated or changed by Torvalds himself and by the other
Linux developers with no eect on the kernel core.8 Device drivers struc-
ture is a good example of the third way followed by Torvalds. One extreme
solution is to put all the hardware specic into the core kernel: this is eas-
ier to do, it increased the performance, but the kernel is totally unportable.
The other extreme solution, consistent with the microkernel design, urges to
leave all the specic in the user space, which declines the performance and
the stability of the system.
In later discussions Torvalds explained the reasons for its choice: a fully
modular architecture, like the one adopted for HURD, would have posed
problems to a degree of complexity that it could compromise the accom-
plishment of the project. To avoid such risks and keep as low as possible the
8Version 2.1.110, released in July 1998, counts around 1,5 million lines of code: 29%
is the kernel and the le systems, 54% are platform{independent drivers and still 17% is
architecture{specic code.
25degree of complexity of the project, he decided to design a monolith and he
actually wrote all the architectural specs himself,9 avoiding all the hassles
due to collective projects (e.g. division of labor, coordination, communica-
tion). On the other hands, Torvalds was aware of other advantages Linux
could gain from introducing some degree of modularity, besides the porting
issue: modular architectures would allow an incremental development of the
system through the involvement of a mass of hackers working in parallel on
dierent components.
\With the Linux kernel it became clear very quickly that we want to have
a system which is as modular as possible. The open{source development
model really requires this, because otherwise you can't easily have people
working in parallel. It's too painful when you have people working on the
same part of the kernel and they clash.
Without modularity I would have to check every le that changed which
would be a lot, to make sure nothing was changed that would eect any-
thing else. With modularity, when someone sends me patches to do a new
lesystem and I don't necessarily trust the patches per se, I can still trust the
fact that if nobody's using this lesystem, it's not going to impact anything
else."[Torvalds, 1999]
The validity of Torvalds choice is under our eyes and it is dicult to
overestimate the consequences of this modular solution with regard to the
subsequent portability and extensibility of the system trough the distributed
eort of the community. Nowadays Linux run on an increasing number of
computers, from workstations to handheld devices and its development is
assured by the eort of tens of thousands developers in the world. Torvalds
and a few other people close to him control the kernel core and have the nal
word in the decisions related to the development of the system. Other de-
velopers, on the other hand, oer their contribution to improve and upgrade
the system.
9Releasing version 0.11 in December 1991, he credited on three other people.
26We already showed how critical were the consequences of inheriting a
modular Unix{like architecture based on complementary and interconnected
components. To a more hidden and critical level the development of the core
of the operative system, the kernel, followed an analogous destiny. The mod-
ular structure adopted by Torvalds for its kernel happened to be successful,
nevertheless it does not prevent the system from emergence of unforeseen
interdependencies within the modules that may rise with the future develop-
ment of hardware and software. While HURD rose as an attempt to develop
a fully general and modular system, Linux's kernel took advantage of some
architectural shortcuts: as it is, the problem related to emergent interdepen-
dencies that were not expected at the beginning may become a problem for
the future successful endurance of Linux, even though this can be regarded
as a future cost for the straightforwardness of its design. Some of these emer-
gent interdependencies may be faced by rewriting or adding some modules,
as it happened for instance with a memory manager module; sometimes the
adopted solutions are not adequate and the communities of developers that
not agree with the nal decision may introducing new alternative versions
of the system. These forks are expression of a coordination failure when
a community does not converge on an unique satisfying solution. Further,
unanticipated interdependencies may end up in more serious problems than
just forks, as it happens when the existing operative systems reveal to be in-
consistent with the architecture of new processors. Torvalds himself is fully
aware of this situation when he describes a future scenario of Linux's decline:
\They'll say Linux was designed for the 80386 and the new CPU's are
doing the really interesting things dierently. Let's drop this old Linux stu.
This is essentially what I did when creating Linux. And in the future, they'll
be able to look at our code, use our interfaces, and provide binary compati-
bility, and if all that happens I'll be happy."[Torvalds, 1999]
It is worthwhile to point out some observations that are suggested by this
story:
27 The design of modular architectures from scratch may reveal to be
extremely complex tasks and therefore designers may prefer integrated
solutions that are easier to manage.
 To avoid out of control increasing of interdependencies the rst phase
of new projects may be more eciently accomplished by individuals,
rather than groups of developers; on the other hand, most of the most
successful F/OSS stories have been started to solve specic problems
and at the beginning are one-man projects: Sendmail was initially
developed by Eric Allman to route email for other users within UC
Berkely, Perl by Larry Wall to solve some bothersome problems in sys-
tem administration, World Wide Web by Tim Berners-Lee as group en-
vironment for academic information sharing among high-energy physi-
cists, etc. [O'Reilly, 1999].
 The evolution of Linux kernel towards modular design oers some in-
sights to a general theory of modularity: it is possible and eective to
combine together under the same architecture modular components and
integrated parts. Later on the designers may introduce a higher degree
of modularity by adapting the original architecture. In other words,
modularity arises more as a process of evolutionary design (modular-
ization), rather than as ultimate property of an artifact.
 Our intuition is that the general violation of the information hiding
principle allowed by the openness of the source code was especially im-
portant in this case. In general terms a partially-modular architecture,
as the one designed for Linux kernel by Torvalds, seems to be more vul-
nerable by the emergence of unforeseen interdependencies that come
out on later development, compared to a fully-modular architecture
(like HURD). Nevertheless Torvalds architecture could bear these situ-
ations more easily because of the violation of one the fundamental rules
of modular implementations, that is the information hiding. Since the
source code is open, developers may better handle with the weaknesses
28of the architecture, avoiding or preventing major inconsistencies.
3.6 Beyond the principles of modularity
We have so far advocate the perspective that the theory of modular systems
may help in interpreting the rise and success of GNU/Linux and of F/OSS
methodologies in general. Nevertheless, in the previous sections, we have also
argued that modular design and production of software artifacts is not new
to software engineering and that it would be misleading and unrepresentative
of reality to attribute its original genesis or to restrict its current application
to the world of F/OSS development.
As a matter of fact, successful examples of production of modularized
software may be found also in proprietary developed code: take for instance
the case of the development of Microsoft Internet Explorer 3.0, Microsoft
rst internally developed Internet browser, that hit nal product release less
than 9 month after the design of the rst initial specications.
As one developers described it:
\We had a large number of people who would have to work in parallel
to meet the target ship date. We therefore had to develop an architecture
where we could have separate component teams feed into the product. [ ::: ]
In fact if someone asked what the most successful aspect of IE3 was, I would
say it was the job we did in `componentizing' the product."10
Hence, the occasional reader may be concerned over our emphasis on the
role of modularity in explaining the emergence of F/OSS development. In
particular, he might as well treat modularity as one of the common trends
present both in F/OSS and proprietary software development, and look else-
where for dierences and peculiarities of F/OSS practices. This is for in-
stance what happened to some of the assumed peculiarities of Linus's devel-
opment style highlighted by Raymond [1999]: subsequent contributions have
10Cited in MacCormack [2001]).
29suggested close resemblance of some of these elements to practices of rapid
development common in closed and proprietary development.11
Still, we are convinced that modularity is helpful in clarifying the debate
and has a great explaining power in characterizing F/OSS. Hence, to address
this potential critiques one has to take a step forward in the theory of mod-
ularity and has to reect on how GNU/Linux, and more generally F/OSS
development, originally adapted the principles of modularity.
We have already speculated on advantages and risks of modularity: a
well{decomposed architecture seems to reconcile considerations about divi-
sion of labor and size of a project with concerns of high speed of development.
Nevertheless, for large complex software artifacts it may be almost impossi-
ble to separate ex-ante all interdependencies, so unforeseen coupling between
components at later stages (like for instance, integrating new and existing
modules), may strongly aect the nal outcome of the process.
The fundamental innovation in F/OSS practices lies in how the basic
postulate of information hiding is adapted to face these diculties. While
information hiding is clearly at the core of designers activities when ini-
tially decomposing a software project in modules, the same principle is then
disregarded, at the implementation level, in day by day coding, test and in-
tegration activities. As a matter of fact, in the F/OSS community, hackers
actually are overexposed to, rather then shielded from, a huge amount of
code.
The free availability of the source makes programming a true public pro-
cess, since good coding solution are shared and adapted to solve new similar
problems, and ex-post interdependency conicts are handled by employing a
wider set of ne tuning strategies. The absence of code ownership, typical
of proprietary closed development, allows to cope with unforeseen interde-
pendencies in many alternative ways: bugs are highlighted and corrected by
11See for instance Bezroukov [1999b] addressing a critical revision of some Raymond's
postulates or Cusumano and Selby [1995] on rapid development methodologies in a large
software corporation).
30other eyeballs, design incoherencies are anticipated and discussed by peers
reviewing code elsewhere written, and so on.
In short, the lesson of F/OSS development is the following: since it is
impossible to design a zero{defect software architecture, it is worth to em-
brace adaptive and exible strategies that ease modules integration by using
all the available (not anymore hidden) information.
4 Discussion
In the end, modularity may be conceived as simple as it is, as long as we
do not open the black box and keep track of the organizational processes
behind the structure. Most quoted contributions in management studies
[Badwin and Clark, 1997, 2000, Ulrich, 1995, Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996]
unfold a neat and smooth theory of modularity, introduced as a cornerstone
for artifact design.12 According to this olympic version, modularity is dened
as a \particular design structure, in which parameters and tasks are interde-
pendent within units (modules) and independent across them" (Baldwin and
Clark 2000, p. 88). Modularity copes with complex systems, as it comprises
the interdependencies at the level of modules. Modularization is a design
process aimed to specify the architecture, the interfaces and the protocols of
integration and testing. The architecture design encompasses to state which
are the modules and what they do and it shapes the border between visible
and hidden information; the interfaces set the rules of interactions among the
modules. Finally, integration and testing steps assess whether unexpected in-
consistencies come out when modules are combined together, revealing some
weaknesses in the architecture or in the interface design. After some rene-
ments the design rules set is complete and the nal architecture is supposed
to take into account all the (relevant) interdependencies.
12For an insightful assessment of this topic see also Langlois [2002] and Devetag and
Zaninotto [2001].
31Unfortunately, this perspective underestimates that modularization of
complex systems generally resolves on a quasi{decomposition and not in a
full decomposition, as some interdependencies may not be predicted or are
left out on purpose, simply because they are regarded as marginal ones.
GNU/Linux is a story of modularity and modularization, but things are
less neat and smooth than it is spelled out by the theory. Mimicking UNIX,
GNU/Linux inherits its modular structure; analyzing UNIX architecture,
Baldwin and Clark (2000, p. 334{336) point out that its modular design has
a static and a dynamic dimension. This operative system has modular static
design based on programs, le structure and pipes. Programs are the actual
modules that are activated to perform the tasks, le structure denes how
the modules are organized and pipes allow to concatenate dierent modules
in order to accomplish compound tasks. Moreover, UNIX is modular in a
dynamic sense, as the activity of the modules is regulated according to an
hierarchical organization (runtime conguration) that allows multiple users
working on multiple tasks to minimize the interdependencies in time sharing
of common resources (processors, printers and other devices).
GNU/Linux, on the other hand, is a story of unorthodox modularity:
information hiding principle is signicantly ignored and the artifact evolves
mainly through a repertoire of practices (e.g. peer coding and debugging,
frank discussions, open decisions) where developers and users work aside,
tinkering and patching the original modular product and, overall, violating
another of the law of the olympic modularity stating that the only operators
are manipulation at the module level (splitting, substituting, augmenting,
excluding, inverting, porting) (Baldwin and Clark (2000, p. 123{146).
In our view, reading the GNU/Linux case according to the modular-
ity perspective provides a complementary understanding of the F/OSS phe-
nomenon and, at the same time, oers some insights to think about the way
we conceive a theory of modularity for complex systems.
With respect to the rst issue, taking advantage of existing architectures
32like UNIX and standards (e.g. POSIX) has been a successful strategy as the
community of developers avoided to design a modular structure from scratch.
The comparison between the HURD project and Torvalds' monolithic ker-
nel shows that to develop decomposable architectures for complex products
expose the designers to the risk of unforeseen interdependencies that may
ultimately endanger the whole project. Besides, as F/OSS developers are
distributed organizations and the community members communicate only
remotely, coordination and collective decision making seem to be two funda-
mental issues in F/OSS development. Following the same rationale, F/OSS
communities should be aware that forking may become a serious potential
thread, as the in the long run a growing number of alternative, incompatible
modules ultimately increases the degree of interdependence of the system. In
fact, new modules (programs, upgrades, patches) either deepen the forking
eect or try to handle it and in this case they need to take into account all
the possible dierent user congurations.
Our analysis seems to clearly highlight the strengths of employing a mod-
ular approach to software production, suggesting that the success of F/OSS
methodologies may rely on the power of modularity in leveraging massively
parallel and distributed development. Moreover, F/OSS practices seem to
overcome one of the traditional limit of modularity. Disregarding the infor-
mation hiding principle at the implementation level allows to x more eec-
tively awed modularization managing unforeseen interdependencies between
modules. Nevertheless, the principles of modularity have still a positive im-
pact in architecture design, since careful ex-ante modularization of complex
software architectures immensely speed up the development phases. The
modularization phase (the decomposition in modules) has been until now in
most of the successful F/OSS projects handled out largely by inheriting and
adapting existing architectures. As long as nowadays the F/OSS commu-
nity seems to be more and more committed in developing state of the art
software based on innovative complex architectures, answering to questions
about who should be the designer and how should innovative architectures
33look like, seems to us one of the most challenging issue that the F/OSS
movement will be soon facing.
GNU/Linux case, on the other hand, suggests some general reections
on modularity and modularization. F/OSS developers exploit all the ad-
vantages of a modular architecture as the massive parallel activity within
modules/programs witnesses; on the other hand, the modularization does
not stop with the architecture design. The unforeseen interdependencies
that come out as the operative system evolve, revealing some inconsistencies
are faced by violating the information hiding principle. In questioning how
exendible this experience is to other contexts where modularity has already
started to represent a promising approach, there are at least two fundamental
conditions that need to be clearly spelled out.
First, F/OSS distinctive trait is represented by the open access to knowl-
edge (source code and documentation) stored in the modules. In F/OSS
world imitation and copy are encouraged and protected by a reverse form
of copyright (copyleft). On the contrary, in many other contexts of produc-
tion, organizations and individual are characterized by actively preventing
this sharing, at least at the inter{organizational level.
Second, GNU/Linux case is characterized by a deep overlap between pro-
ducers and users. At least at the beginning of the story most users were
developers or had some skills that allowed them to perform successful tinker-
ing. Again, most of the traditional ways to conceive innovation and product
development in other domains keeps separated producers and users, even
though today customers are more and more often directly involved in the
denition of their own product.
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